Products Liability and Evidence of Subsequent Repairs by unknown
PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND EVIDENCE OF
SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS
The theories of strict liability in tort' and implied warranty 2 ena-
ble a plaintiff injured by a defective product to recover damages from
the product's manufacturer or distributor with whom he is not in
privity3 and whose negligent conduct has not been established., Al-
though these new theories' of liability have made recovery easier, the
I. For a statement of the theory of strict tort liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A (1965):
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
THE FOLLOWING HEREINAFTER CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS NOTE:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT];
Carmichael, Strict Liability in Tort-An Explosion in Products Liability Law, 20 DRAKE
L. REv. 528 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Carmichael].
2. Implied warranty is codified in the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1):
Implied Warranty: Merchantability: Usage of Trade. . . . [A] warranty that the goods
shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant
with respect to goods of that kind ....
3. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 413, 161 A.2d 69, 100 (1960):
"[L]ack of privity does not stand in the way of prosecution of the injury suit against the
defendant ....
See also UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-318:
Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Express or Implied. A seller's warranty whether
express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of
his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person
may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach
of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section.
4. "A manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places on the market,
knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes
injury to a human being." Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897,
900, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1962). See also RESTATEMENT § 402A(2).
5. The new theories-strict liability in tort and implied warranty without privity of con-
tract-are the result of a "revolution" during the last decade in products liability law. There
had been a gradual evolution for more than a century. In 1842 one court said: "[I]t is, no doubt,
a hardship upon the plaintiff to be without a remedy, but by that consideration we ought not
be influenced." Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 402,405 (Ex.
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products liability plaintiff must still prove, inter alia, the defective-
ness of the injury-causing product' and the defendant's control
over the product when it was in such defective condition.' These
elements of the plaintiff's case must be established by more
1842) (plaintiff-mail coach driver for Postmaster General could not recover from supplier of
mail coach for injury caused by latent defect in coach). But in the early twentieth century a
strict liability in tort or implied warranty developed in unwholesome food cases, beginning with
Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 P. 633 (1913) (cooked tongue), extended to
"inherently" or "imminently" dangerous products, MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
382, III N.E. 1050 (1916) (automobile), and to articles for intimate bodily use, Graham v.
Bottenfield's, Inc., 176 Kan. 68, 269 P.2d 413 (1954) (hair preparation). The revolution which
extended the new theories of products liability law to all products began with Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (automobile), and Greenman v. Yuba
Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (combination power tool).
For the development of the recent revolution in products liability law, see Carmichael; Prosser,
The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966);
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV.
363 (1965); Waddams, Strict Liabilities, Warranties, and the Sale of Goods, 19 U. TORONTO
L. REV. 157 (1969).
6. In addition to the elements of defectiveness and control, the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant sold the defective product, that the defect was the proximate cause of the injuries
of which the plaintiff complains, and that the defendant was engaged in the business of selling
such products. RESTATEMENT § 402A(l).
7. A defect in a product may be of two types: (1) an unintentional defect in the condition
of the product resulting from an error, whether negligently caused or not, in the manufacturing
of a product such that the defect may occur in only one unit of the product; and (2) a product
which is manufactured as designed, but which nevertheless causes an injury because it is
defective in its design. L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODucTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][e] (1970).
In a definitional sense, a defect in a product is a significant risk of physical harm to a
definable class of consumers or users which the normal member thereof would not anticipate
or guard against. See generally Dickerson, How Good Does a Product Have To Be?, 42 IND.
L.J. 301 (1967).
There are two legal tests for defects in a product: "unmerchantable," defined as a product
unfit "for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used," UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 2-314(2)(c); and "unreasonably dangerous," which may be defined as a danger beyond that
which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer or user who has knowledge common
to the community as to the product's characteristics, RESTATEMENT § 402A and comments g-
k. See also Emroch, Testimony and Proof in a Products Liability Case, 1966 A.B.A. SECTION
INS., N. & C.L. 172, 179-80.
If a product were unreasonably dangerous, seemingly it would also be unfit for the purpose
for which it was ordinarily intended, and it has been held that the test for unmerchantability is
equivalent to the unreasonably dangerous test for strict liability in tort. Santor v. A & M
Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 66-67, 207 A.2d 305, 313 (1965). See also Dickerson, supra, at
304; Emroch, supra, at 180-81. But see Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 93-95,
179 N.W.2d 64, 68-71 (1970), suggesting that the tests for strict liability in tort and implied
warranty are different, although the court relied only on the strict liability in tort test.
For the purpose of this Note, "defect" will be used generally, encompassing any differences
between implied warranty and strict liability in tort definitions.
8. See Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 183-84, 199 A.2d 826, 830
(1964), where the court stated that "plaintiff [must] show that the dangerous condition which
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than mere inferences from the occurrence of injury,9 because where
the product has been removed from the defendant's control for a
substantial time and intervening causes may have contributed to the
injury, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable.'" Eyewitness
testimony concerning the product's malfunction must be bolstered by
expert testimony identifying the defect and its origin," evidence ne-
gating causes of the injury other than the product's defectiveness, and
circumstantial evidence tending to prove that the product was defec-
tive while under the defendant's control. Evidence of subsequent re-
pairs and improvements is potentially persuasive of both the prod-
uct's defective condition and the defendant's control. If a defendant
alters his product to eliminate the injury-causing device or to guard
he contends constitutes a breach of warranty had its genesis when the instrumentality was
within the control of the manufacturer." See also Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal.
2d 57, 64, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962).
9. See, e.g., Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 234 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1956); Jakubowski v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 182, 199 A.2d 826, 829 (1964). But see Greco v.
Bucciconi Eng'r Co., 283 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Pa. 1967), affd, 407 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1969).
10. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has normally been used to establish negligence, which
is not an issue in strict liability in tort or implied warranty cases. See Emroch, supra note 7, at
175-76. However, where a defect could be established, the doctrine might be invoked to show
that the product was defective when it was in the manufacturer's control if the injury occurred
soon after the plaintiff gained control from the manufacturer with no evidence of intervening
misuse. See, e.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 412, 161 A.2d 69, 97-
99 (1960) (defective automobile caused injury ten days after delivery). If, however, the product
has been out of the manufacturer's control for a long time, or has passed through several
hands-for example, the wholesaler, distributor and retailer-the doctrine cannot be used.
Wallace v. Knapp-Monarch Co., 234 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1956) (res ipsa loquitur held inapplica-
ble where injury was caused by a vaporizer borrowed from a neighbor who bought it two years
previously); Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964) (res
ipsa loquitur inapplicable where plaintiff fails to show proper care and handling of the product
subsequent to purchase). See also Carmichael 546; Keeton, Products Liability-Proof of the
Manufacturer's Negligence, 49 VA. L. REv. 675, 680-81 (1963).
II. Evidence from expert testimony is often crucial in establishing a defect in a product.
See, e.g., Lewis v. United States Rubber Co., 414 Pa. 626, 202 A.2d 20 (1964), where plaintiff's
expert testified that, because no "tell-tale" marks were on a tire, the severed cord in the tire
must have been the cause, not the result, of the explosion in the tire which caused plaintiff's
injury.
There are, however, limitations to the value of expert testimony. The product may be
completely destroyed in the accident which caused the injury. Even if the product is still
available, experts examine the injury-causing object only after the accident; if from that belated
examination they can identify a defect which caused the accident, the defect still must be traced
to the defendant's control, which may be difficult if the defect could have developed through
misuse after the plaintiff gained control of the product. Keeton, Products Liability-Problems
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 37 (1965). Moreover, experts are expensive
and, in some instances, may all be in the employ of the defendant-manufacturer or his competi-
tors. Hazard, Science and the Product Liability Claim, 54 A.B.A.J. 981 (1968).
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against its potential dangers, such repair or improvement tends to
indicate not only that the product was previously defective, but also
that the defendant had the requisite control to prevent the product
from being marketed with that defect.
This Note will examine the use of evidence of subsequent repairs
in products liability cases. First, the status of the rule excluding such
evidence in negligence cases will be reviewed; then, consideration will
be directed to whether changes in this rule are warranted when evi-
dence of subsequent repairs is used in products liability cases
predicated upon the theories of strict liability in tort and implied
warranty.
EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS IN NEGLIGENCE CASES
General Exclusionary Rule
The admission of evidence of subsequent repairs is regulated by
a general exclusionary rule developed when most personal injury
cases were predicated upon the negligence of the defendant. Such
evidence has traditionally been excluded for two reasons-lack of
relevance, and a public policy favoring encouragement of repairs.' 2
When recovery for personal injury is predicated upon negligence, at
issue is not only the potential for harm of an object which is within
the defendant's control, but also the ability of the defendant to fore-
see that potential for harm before the injury actually occurs. Since
the defendant's subsequent actions in repairing the defective condi-
tion may show his discovery and realization that the object is capable
of causing future harm rather than his negligence in failing to foresee
the potential for harm, the evidence of subsequent repairs is fre-
quently not relevant to the issue of negligence. 3 Such evidence is
12. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 252 (1954); 2 J. WGMORE, TREATISE ON EvI-
DENCE § 283 (3d ed. 1940). The general exclusionary rule has been held applicable to products
liability cases as well as other personal injury cases. See, e.g., Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co.,
353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965) (subsequent improvement of a rifle not relevant to the question
of negligent design); Cox v. General Elec. Co., 302 F.2d 389, 390 (6th Cir. 1962) (alleged
negligently designed washing machine); Northwest Airlines v. Glenn L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d
120, 130 (6th Cir. 1955) (alleged negligent design and manufacture of airplanes); Foley v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co., 215 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Mo. App. 1948) (tacks in soft drink). See also L.
FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, § 12.04 (1964, Supp. 1971).
13. Courts have tended to be more adamant on this point than commentators. Compare
Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) ("[T]he taking of such
precautions against the future . . . has no legitimate tendency to prove that the defendant had
been negligent before the accident happened. ... ) and Terre Haute & I.R.R. v. Clem, 123
Ind. 15, 17, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890) ("[I]t is what occurs prior to the action, not what happens
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relevant to the extent that it establishes that the product was capable
of causing injury; 4 however, there is fear that, despite the court's
instructions, a jury might construe the defendant's repairmaking as
an admission of his negligence or liability. 5 This potentially prejudi-
cial effect of the evidence conflicts with a strong public interest in
encouraging repairs and improvement of injury-causing objects. 16
Knowledge that post-injury alterations to the injury-causing object
could be used to impose liability might discourage a person capable
of making repairs from doing so.
Exceptions to the General Rule
The general exclusionary rule is subject to numerous exceptions
which permit evidence of subsequent repairs to be admitted for lim-
ited purposes. 7 Evidence that a party made repairs is admissible to
show that he had control over the object and, therefore, a duty to
maintain it in a safe condition." When the injury-causing object has
been altered and testimony or photographs of the object in its altered
condition are introduced, evidence of the modification is admissible
to distinguish the condition of the object at the time of the injury from
afterwards, that determines whether there has or has not been a culpable breach of duty.") with
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 252 ("[I]t would often meet the usual standards of rele-
vancy.") and J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 283 ("[Ilt would suffice for admissibility if merely
the inference was a fairly possible one .... ").
14. It also tends to show that the defect could have been prevented by the manufacturer.
See text following note 59 infra.
15. Professor Wigmore believes that it is "plainly false" to assume that the act of improving
the condition of an object, after the threat or occurrence of an injury, indicates a belief of
negligence on the owner's part; inevitable accidents and contributory negligence are equally
plausible reasons. 2 J. WIGMORE, supra, note 12, § 283. "To improve the condition of the
injury-causing object is therefore to indicate a belief merely that it has been capable of causing
such an injury, but indicates nothing more. ... Id. See also Columbia & Puget Sound R.R.
v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892); Terre Haute & I.R.R. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15, 17, 23
N.E. 965, 966 (1890); Morse v. Minneapolis & St. L. Ry., 30 Minn. 465, 468, 16 N.W. 358,
359 (1883).
16. This policy was eloquently described in Terre Haute & I. R.R. v. Clem, 123 Ind. 15,
19, 23 N.E. 965, 966 (1890): "True policy and sound reason require that men should be
encouraged to improve or repair, and not be deterred from it by the fear that, if they do so,
their acts will be construed into an admission that they had been wrongdoers." See generally
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 252; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 253.
17. For a list of the exceptions and the extensive underlying case law, see C. MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, § 252; 2 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 283; Note, Admissibility of Evidence of
Subsequent Safety Measures, 37 TEx. L. REv. 478 (1959).
18. See, e.g., Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969),
where photographic evidence of repair of machinery by Sara Lee was held properly admissible
for the limited purpose of showing that Sara Lee, and not a co-defendant, controlled the
conveyor and possessed a duty to make necessary structural changes in the conveyor.
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its present condition.' 9 An additional broad exception to the general
exclusionary rule permits evidence of subsequent repairs to demon-
strate the feasibility of making the object safer when the defendant
has alleged that the condition of the product could not be improved."0
This feasibility exception has been extended to admit such evidence
not only to rebut the purported reasonableness of industry safety
standards,2 but also where the plaintiff initially raised the issue of
feasibility of improvement and then introduced the otherwise ex-
cluded evidence.22
Narrowing the General Rule
Recently, some courts have admitted evidence of subsequent re-
pairs whenever the reasons for exclusion-irrelevancy and encourage-
ment of repairs-are not operative and hence do not justify exclusion
of the evidence.23 Some judges have limited the exclusionary rule to
the benefit of the party who actually made the repair. In Brown v.
Quick Mix Co.,24 the plaintiff joined as defendants the manufacturer
19. See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 321 F.2d 683, 690 (5th
Cir. 1963), where evidence of the defendant's improvements and preparations for improvements
subsequent to an accident was admitted for the limited purpose of showing the condition of
defendant's plant at the time of the accident.
20. See, e.g., Hickey v. Kansas City So. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1956), where counsel
for defendant stated in his opening remarks that it was impossible to remedy the dangerous
railroad crossing where plaintiff was injured. Evidence of a later repair of that crossing was
admitted to rebut this contention.
This exception is similar to another exception which permits evidence of subsequent repairs
for impeachment-for example, where defendant testifies that the injury-causing object is as
safe as possible.
21. See Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1959), where plaintiff was permit-
ted to show that, after the injury, defendant added an additional barrier to the gate in the fence
surrounding its power station even though defendant never contended that such additional
precautions were impossible, but only that the pre-accident safety measures were those custom-
ary to power stations.
22. See, e.g., Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 839, 454 P.2d 205, 209 (1969):
"[T]he evidence is competent regardless of whether the issue is a part of the plaintiff's case
• . . or [whether] the defendant inject[ed] it as a defense." However, Judge Neill, in dissent,
criticized the majority for allowing "plaintiff to initially inject evidence of feasibility" and thus
enabling the jury to find the defendant negligent "on evidence admitted on an issue which it
neither created nor contested." Id. at 84243, 454 P.2d at 211.
23. The generally recognized exceptions are permitted because the specific and limited
purposes for which the evidence is admitted serve an important role in seeking the truth at trial.
See, e.g., Hickey v. Kansas City So. Ry., 290 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1956), supra note 20, If the
assertion that the railroad crossing could not be improved were allowed to stand unrebutted, it
would have been extremely prejudicial to the plaintiff's case.
24. 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969).
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and retailer of the construction machinery which had caused his in-
jury. The court admitted evidence of a post-accident repair made by
the plaintiff's employer, who had not been joined as a defendant. On
appeal, the court, in upholding admission of the evidence, noted that
since the defendants had not made the repair, the jury would not
construe it as an admission of their guilt or their control over the
machine.2 Arguably, a properly instructed jury would not use such
evidence to impute prior knowledge to a defendant who never made
repairs and who may never have had any knowledge of the de-
fect-prior or subsequent to the injury. The policy of encouraging
repairs is preserved in Quick Mix, since persons will not be discour-
aged from making repairs if they know evidence of the repair cannot
be used against them; therefore, since the evidence is relevant to the
proof of defectiveness, it should be admitted for that purpose. This
argument is less persuasive, however, when the evidence is admitted
against a defendant who did not make the repairs while the repair-
making party is before the court as a co-defendant. In Wallner v.
Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 2 the plaintiff joined as co-defendants his
employer and the manufacturer of the machine which had caused his
injury. Since the employer had made post-injury improvements, the
court reasoned that the policy of encouraging repairs which underlies
the general rule was inapplicable to the non-repairing manufacturer
and that he could not invoke the rule to protect himself from the
adverse use of the evidence of subsequent repairs.2 The jury could be
instructed to consider the evidence as to the manufacturer but not the
employer, 28 and to limit its use of the evidence only to the issues of
defectiveness and control, not to the issue of foreseeability. This
selective application of the exclusionary rule might promote the pub-
lic policy of encouraging repairs by insulating the co-defendant who
first effects repairs; where the liability for an injury may fall on one
of several defendants, a race to repair, in order to avoid the adverse
application of the evidence, is conceivable. The danger of the Wallner
rationale is the likelihood that the jury will ignore the court's instruc-
tions and impute the significance of the evidence to all the defendants.
To the extent that the evidence is potentially harmful to all defen-
25. 75 Wash. 2d at 840, 454 P.2d at 210; accord, Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280
F.2d 380, 382 (3d Cir. 1960).
26. 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969).
27. Id. at 1032.
28. The evidence was admitted against both defendants in Wallner, however, since control
was also an issue. Id. See note 18 supra.
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dants, the policy of encouraging repairs is undermined. Furthermore,
the Wallner rationale fails to deal adequately with the relevancy
issue. If any court is willing to admit evidence of subsequent repairs
over objections to its irrelevancy merely because the judge instructs
the jury to limit its application to the issues of defectiveness and
control, then there is nothing left of the irrelevancy argument. 9
Courts have also distinguished "repairs" from "technological
improvements," admitting evidence of a product's technological im-
provements not prompted by a specific prior injury." In Wichman
v. Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co.,3 1 the defendant-manufacturer developed
a protective device for farm machinery already sold and in use. While
the devices were being distributed, the plaintiff was injured by a
machine not yet equipped with the safety devices. Although the im-
provement was not a modification in response to the plaintiffs injury,
it seems that this is exactly the type of action-either as a repair or
technological development-which should be encouraged. Neverthe-
less, evidence of the change was admitted without adequate consider-
ation of either its relevance or the effect of the admission on the
policy of encouraging repairs.32 Technically, since the improvement
was already made, there was no further need to encourage the manu-
facturer, and there may be no justification for "rewarding" him by
excluding the evidence. Perhaps fear of expanded liability does not
significantly discourage technological improvements which may be
motivated by a desire to prevent liability from arising in the first
place. The preventive nature of this type of improvement is far
removed from the understandable reluctance of a potential defendant
to repair a product which he knows to have caused an injury for which
29. Cf Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 842, 454 P.2d 205, 211 (1969) (dissent-
ing opinion): "It is not realistic to hope that the jury will make the fine distinctions required
to differentiate between evidence of the feasibility of making a change to prevent an injury,
and negligence itself." An inability of the jury to distinguish between defendants in the use of
evidence is just as probable. For additional precautions which the courts must take in admitting
evidence in a jury trial, as opposed to a trial before the judge, see Northwest Airlines v. Glenn
L. Martin Co., 224 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1955). But cf Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d
310 (9th Cir. 1961).
30. See Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965): "[T]he exclu-
sionary 'repairs' doctrine did not squarely apply [to an improvement which] represented a
technological improvement not prompted by a specific prior injury." However, the court did
state that such evidence could be excluded as irrelevant. Id.
31. 117 F. Supp. 857 (W.D. Mo. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 220 F.2d 426 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 835 (1955).
32. Id. at 860.
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he may be liable." Nevertheless, the Wichman court failed to con-
sider the relevance of the evidence, which may not have been proba-
tive of the defendant's ability to foresee the potential for harm at the
time the machine was manufactured.
A Positive Subsequent Repair Rule
Limitations on the applicability of the rule excluding evidence of
subsequent repairs and improvements have effectively limited the
benefit which the defendant derives from the general exclusionary
rule. Instead of excluding most evidence of subsequent repairs, courts
appear willing, if not eager, to admit such evidence.34 With the rule
so restricted in its application and subject to many exceptions, it will
be a rare plaintiff who cannot find a justification for introducing
evidence of subsequent repairs, particularly when several defendants
have been joined in the action. The rule no longer appears to be one
of general exclusion; rather, the rule for evidence of subsequent re-
pairs may now be a positive rule of admissibility subject only to the
exception that evidence of subsequent repairs is admissible unless it
is used against the party who made the repair as an admission of his
negligence.:5
EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS IN STRICT LIABILITY AND
IMPLIED WARRANTY CASES
Though there is a tendency toward more general admissibility of
evidence of subsequent repairs in negligence cases, there has been
little consideration of the application of the exclusionary rule to prod-
ucts liability cases predicated upon strict liability in tort and implied
warranty theories. The inherent proof and policy differences between
33. The maker of technological improvements probably will be more influenced by the
possibility of economic gain derived from marketing a "technologically improved" product. See
also text following note 46 infra.
34. Once the court has admitted evidence of subsequent repairs, the plaintiff may be free
to introduce evidence of repairs of defects which have no causal connection to the injury. Cf
Boeing Airplane Co. v. Brown, 291 F.2d 310, 315-16 (9th Cir. 1961), where, although defendant
was willing to admit changes had occurred, plaintiff was allowed to introduce evidence of
specific changes. When the evidence of changes went beyond those defects which were shown
to have a causal connection to the injury, the court held that as long as ultimate responsibility
was placed upon a defect, inquiry into defects beyond the one actually causing the injury was
relevant.
35. See Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028, 1032 (7th Cir. 1969), where
the court stated: "Evidence of post-accident repairs or changes is properly introduced for any
purpose except to demonstrate the negligence of a defendant."
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negligence and these new theories may justify disregarding the rule
altogether.
Relevancy
In products liability cases predicated upon strict liability in tort
and implied warranty, at issue is not foreseeability but rather the
product's defective condition and the defendant's control over the
product. Post-accident repair or improvements have been recognized
as relevant to the issues of defectiveness and control even in
negligence-based cases." Admitting evidence of subsequent repairs
to show defectiveness in the strict liability case is similar to the estab-
lished exception which permits admission of such evidence to demon-
strate the feasibility of improvement in the negligence setting. The
purpose is the same-to demonstrate the defendant's ability to make
a safer product. Furthermore, since negligence is not at issue, there
is less likelihood that the evidence will be misdirected to establish
defendant's prior misconduct.37
Evidence of subsequent repairs is also valuable as an aid to the
jury in determining the legal defectiveness of the injury-causing prod-
uct. A product is considered to be legally defective if it is "unreasona-
bly dangerous" or "unmerchantable. ' ' 31 By comparing the repaired
or improved product with the original injury-causing product, the
jury may draw inferences as to the feasible degree of safety in a
product. The trier of fact is then better able to determine the degree
of safety needed to conform to the standard of reasonable safety or
merchantability.39 This use of evidence of subsequent repairs was
36. See note 15 supra. See also Steele v. Wiedemann Mach. Co., 280 F.2d 380 (3d Cir.
1960). The defendant-manufacturer introduced evidence that the plaintiff's employer ordered
a replacement part subsequent to the plaintiff's injury, contending that the evidence established
that the original part was worn or missing and that this worn or missing part, not a defect,
was responsible for the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff sought to exclude the evidence by offering
other equally plausible explanations for the ordering of the replacement part. Recognizing that
the employer's actions could be explained by various hypotheses, not all of which tended to
prove the defectiveness of the original part, the court held that the proponent of evidence need
only show the probability of the desired conclusion to shift the burden of establishing other
probable explanations to his opponent. Id. at 382-83.
37. See note 29 supra and accompanying text.
38. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
39. See Johnson v. United States, 270 F.2d 488, 491-92 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362
U.S. 924 (1960). The issue was the standard of reasonable care for a fence surrounding a high
voltage power plant. Defendant offered expert testimony on the established industry practice.
Plaintiff offered evidence of subsequent repairs to rebut the contention that the customary
practice constituted reasonable care by showing the practicality of additional safeguards. Cf
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recognized in Rosin v. International Harvester Co.,40 where the plain-
tiff's expert witness compared an original injury-causing part to an
improved replacement part, thus aiding the jury in its determination
of whether. the original was adequate for its intended purpose or
whether the quality of the improved part was the appropriate stan-
dard for a reasonably safe design.4 1 In a products liability case, there-
fore, where the issue is the defectiveness of the product rather than
the negligence of a defendant, evidence of subsequent repairs is rele-
vant to the proof of a reasonably attainable safety standard to which
the quality of the injury-causing product can be compared.
Evidence of subsequent repairs is. also relevant to the issue of the
defendant's control over the defective. product. 2 When the product
has passed through several distributors of has been in the plaintiffs
control for a substantial period of time, the plaintiff must establish
that the defect was in existence while the product was under the
defendant's control and overcome the possibility of intervening
causes. Since it is reasonable to suppose that a defendant who is now
capable of repairing a defect must have previously had that defect
under his control, the evidence of subsequent repair is probative of
the defendant's control over the defect. Evidence of subsequent re-
pairs is already admissible as an exception to the general rule to prove
control when disputed in negligence cases. In the strict liability setting
the recognized exception may become the rule.
Policy of Encouraging Repairs
Although there can be no objection to the relevance of evidence
of subsequent repairs in a strict liability case, the public policy favor-
ing encouragement of repairs still exists and merits protection. It can
be argued that the defendant will be deterred from making needed
repairs by the realization that he is providing evidence for a potential
plaintiff under any theory of liability. However, the balance of policy
considerations has not remained static under the new theories of
Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 57 Tenn. App. 206, 213-14, 417 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1966). Experts
testified to a minimum industry standard for the construction of a set of steps. The jury was
allowed to use evidence of subsequent repairs to steps which had collapsed to determine if the
repairs were required to bring the steps within the minimum standard as established by the
expert testimony.
40. 262 Minn. 445, 115 N.W.2d 50 (1962).
41. 262 Minn. at 453, 115 N.W.2d at 55.
42. See notes 8-11 supra and accompanying text.
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products liability. Strict liability in tort and implied warranty without
privity are reflections of a policy decision-one who markets defec-
tive products should be responsible for injuries caused by those prod-
ucts.43 Exclusion of relevant evidence which aids an injured plaintiff
to recover against the distributor44 of a defective product contradicts
that policy decision.
One reason for applying strict liability is to encourage the distrib-
utor of mass-produced goods to market safer products.45 If the plain-
tiff has a lighter burden of proof, distributors will tale greater pre-
cautions to avoid the increased incidence of liability. It would be
inconsistent to encourage greater care by threatening increased liabil-
ity and, at the same time, to exclude relevant and essential evidence
from the litigation.
The assumption that the admission of evidence of subsequent
repairs discourages defendants from making required repairs may be
erroneous. Manufacturers and distributors of mass-produced prod-
ucts may not be so callous to the safety of the consumer as the general
exclusionary rule presumes." Furthermore, to the extent that admis-
sion of such evidence results in recovery by injured plaintiffs, it can
be argued that evidence of subsequent repairs encourages future re-
medial action. A distributor of mass-produced goods may have
thousands of goods on the market. If his products are defective, the
43. "[S]ociety's interest [demands an elimination of the requirement of privity so that] the
burden of losses consequent upon use of defective articles is borne by those who are in a position
to either control the danger or make an equitable distribution of the losses when they do occur."
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 379, 161 A.2d 69, 81 (1960); accord,
Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63, 377 P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701
(1967). See also Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). But cf Prosser, supra note 5, at 799-800, suggesting that the
courts rely mainly on the manufacturer's ability to prevent defects, and that "[ihe 'risk distrib.
uting' theory-the supplier should be held liable because he is in a position to insure against
liability and add the cost to the price of his product-has been an almost universal favorite
with the professors; but it has received little mention in the cases, and still appears to play only
the part of a makeweight argument."
44. The products liability plaintiff can recover from anyone in the distribution chain, from
manufacturer to retailer. See note 55 infra and accompanying text. The term "distributors"
hereinafter will be used generically to denote all those in the distribution chain whom the
plaintiff may sue.
45. See Carmichael 531-32. But see Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability
to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
46. See Kennelly, Litigation ofan Aircrash Case Against Manufacturer and Airline Which
Resulted in Verdict for Two Million Dollars for Single Death, 1965 TRIAL LAWYER'S GUIDE
153, 203-04, describing the rule against evidence of subsequent repairs as "horse and buggy
law, totally inconsistent with the conduct of manufacturing industries of the world today." See
also Prosser, supra note 45, at 1119.
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distributor would probably face greater total liability by allowing
such defective products to remain on the market or by continuing to
put more defective products on the market than he would by being
adjudged liable in one particular case where evidence of subsequent
repairs was introduced. Also, concern on the part of the distributors
for consumer protection is promoted by consumer organizations, fed-
eral agencies, and mass media exposure of product defects.47 To some
extent, the economic self-interest of product distributors requires that
they repair and improve defective products to avoid adverse publicity
which might result from future litigation. Since a prior jury finding
of product defectiveness is admissible in a subsequent suit when the
product causing the second injury is substantially similar to the first,4
distributors of defective products are under pressure to repair or alter
their products to insulate themselves from a finding of defectiveness
which may be used against them in subsequent litigation.
In conclusion, excluding evidence of subsequent repairs to encour-
47. Cf Carmichael 531.
For example, consumer protection groups, a government agency and mass media joined
forces to expose a defect in Chevrolet automobiles and forced General Motors to recall millions
of cars to install safety devices. After months of investigation by the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration and auto safety critic Ralph Nader and his associates, GM responded
to "rising governmental pressure" and "voluntarily announced" the recall, blaming" 'publicity'
given the engine mount issue." The recall was made only after "a number of accidents and
lawsuits [had been] reported." Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1971, at 4, col. 2.
48. See Prashker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 258 F.2d 602, 608 (3d Cir. 1958); Berry v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 371 Mich. 428, 430, 124 N.W.2d 290, 291 (1963). Res judicata or
collateral estoppel would not be applicable in such a case. Hypothesized is a situation where,
for a period of time after a product defect caused injury, the distributor could have, but did
not, make repairs, and a similar product caused a second injury. Res judicata application-for
the benefit of a plaintiff not a party to earlier litigation in which the issues of defectiveness or
control were found against the same defendant-requires at least that: the issues be identical;
the defendant have full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues, including a non-hostile forum
and reasonable opportunity and motivation to exhaust all appeals; and the defendant have full
knowledge of other plaintiffs waiting in the wings to use the fact findings collaterally. Res
judicata for the benefit of new plaintiffs is best appliable to mass accident cases where many
plaintiffs, injured by a single product defect, bring a series of suits against the same defendant.
Res judicata would not be applicable in the situation hypothesized because the defendant may
not be aware of other potential plaintiffs since the occurrence being litigated did not produce a
mass accident, and there might not be the same motivation for exhaustive litigation or appeal.
See Currie, Civil Procedure: The Tempest Brews, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 25, 27-37 (1965). Compare
Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964) and United States v. United Air Lines,
Inc., 216 F. Supp. 709 (E.D. Wash., D. Nev. 1962), modified on other grounds sub nom.,
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964) with Berner v. British Common-
wealth Pac. Airlines, Ltd., 346 F.2d 532 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 983 (1966). In
mass accident litigation where res judicata is applicable, the distributor of a defective product
has no opportunity to make repairs subsequent to his discovery of the defect.
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age future remedial action may preclude recovery under theories of
products liability which are themselves designed to ensure safety in
marketed products. Relevant evidence should not be excluded from
a products liability case by an obsolete evidentiary rule when modern
legal theories, accompanied by economic and political pressures, will
achieve the desired policy goals.
PROBLEMS WITH THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT
REPAIRS
If the necessity of admitting evidence of subsequent repairs is
conceded, the courts must nevertheless contend with different prob-
lems caused by admission of such evidence. In addition to the persist-
ent problem of possible jury misuse of the evidence, a new problem
arises-how does the evidence of subsequent repairs apply to technol-
ogically new products or products for which there has been a technol-
ogical breakthrough in design?
Jury Misuse of the Evidence
The jury may infer an admission of liability from the defendant's
repair-making."5 Juries should not be permitted to find the defendant
liable on such evidence alone in disregard of such other essential
elements of the plaintiff's case as proximate cause, legal defectiveness
of the product, and control by the defendant. The court must ensure
that the plaintiff has introduced independent evidence for all material
elements of his case, that a factual dispute exists for jury resolution,
and that the jury is properly instructed to restrict its use of the evi-
dence of subsequent repairs to the issues of defectiveness and control.
Although subsequent remedial action is relevant to the issue of
defectiveness, it is neither an admission nor conclusive proof that the
product was in fact defective. A proper use of evidence of subsequent
repairs is to aid the jury in establishing a standard of reasonable
safety or merchantability to which it can compare the quality of the
injury-causing product. 0 It is difficult, however, to distinguish be-
tween defectiveness in the sense that the product might have been
improved, and legal defectiveness because the product was
49. Courts have expressed a similar concern in cases predicated upon negligence. See note
15 supra and accompanying text.
50. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1972:837
SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS
unreasonably dangerous or unmerchantable. 51 Since the jury may find
the product legally defective only if the injury-causing product failed
to conform to a standard of reasonable safety or merchantability
established by competent evidence, the need remains for careful in-
structions as to the proper use of evidence of subsequent repairs.
Products liability litigation can be predicated upon multiple theo-
ries; a single products liability complaint often alleges the defendant's
negligence, his strict liability in tort, and his violation of an implied
warranty.5 2 Since evidence of subsequent repairs is not relevant to the
issue of the defendant's ability to foresee the consequences of his
conduct, the court may avoid the possibility of jury misuse of the
evidence for the issue of defendant's negligence by totally excluding
evidence of subsequent repairs from all cases in which negligence is
pleaded. Thus, the plaintiff may be forced to choose between the
value of the introduction of such evidence for his strict liability and
implied warranty claims and the value of retaining an allegation of
the defendant's negligence.53 Alternatively, the court may view this
as a problem inherent in the admission of any evidence and protect
against the additional possible misuse of evidence of subsequent re-
pairs by employing the usual techniques of close supervision of the
51. Prosser, supra note 5, at 809-10. See note 7 supra.
The following test for "legally defective" has been proposed:
(1) The product carries a significant physical risk to a definable class of consumer and
the risk is ascertainable at least by the time of trial.
(2) The risk is one that the typical member of the class does not anticipate and guard
against.
(3) The risk threatens established consumer expectations with respect to a contem-
plated use and manner of use of the product and a contemplated minimum level of
performance.
(4) The seller has reason to know of the contemplated use and, possibly where injurious
side effects are involved, has reasonable access to knowledge of the particular risk
involved.
(5) The seller knowingly participates in creating the contemplated use, or in otherwise
generating the relevant consumer expectations, in the way attributed to him by the
consumer. Dickerson, supra note 7, at 331.
See generally Prosser, supra note 5, at 807-14.
52. See, e.g., Brown v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 545 P.2d 205 (1969), where
plaintiff based his claim upon the manufacturer's negligence and implied warranty of fitness,
and the court added that he also could have pleaded strict liability in tort as expressed in
RESTATEMENT § 402A.
The Restatement has expressly stated that strict liabiliy in tort is not to be an exclusive
remedy for personal injury. Id. comment a.
53. A possible value of proving negligence is that establishing the blameworthiness of the
defendant's prior misconduct may play upon the jury's sympathies, resulting in higher general
damages or even punitive damages.
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trial and proper instructions limiting the jury's use of evidence to the
issues of strict liability and implied warranty. Such limiting instruc-
tions, however, are the type available in any negligence case and have
generally not been employed by the courts, which have instead chosen
to exclude the evidence as irrelevant to the issue of negligence. Since
the irrelevancy of subsequent repairs generally has been held suffi-
cient to bar the evidence from negligence cases, the former approach
of denying the use of such evidence where negligence is pleaded may
be the more logically consistent, albeit the harsher, solution.
The products liability plaintiff will probably join as defendants all
those in the distribution chain of the product-from manufacturer to
retailer.55 The retailer may cross-claim56 or bring a third-party ac-
tion57 against the wholesaler for indemnity; the wholesaler may in
turn cross-claim against the manufacturer, who becomes the primary
defendant or indemnitor 8 When the jury must decide the indemnity
claims as well as the plaintiffs claim, the issue of control becomes
more significant since the jury must determine under whose control
the product first became defective. The creation of the defect cannot
be inferred solely from a defendant's ability later to correct the de-
fect; the retailer or even the owner of the defectively manufactured
product may make the repairs.59 Similarly, subsequent distributors or
users of a safely manufactured product may assemble or modify it
in such a way as to render it dangerous. The manufacturer then may
make a "subsequent repair" which renders the product immune from
such dangers. With the denials of negligence which may occur in
multi-party litigation, the court must carefully instruct the jury to
trace the defect back to the party responsible for the origin of the
54. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
55. RESTATEMENT § 402A, comment f; Prosser, supra note 5, at 814-17. The purpose of
joining all defendants of the distribution chain is to avoid possible defenses which may be
available to one, but not all, of the defendants. For example, a manufacturer may claim
alteration or change of the product by the wholesaler or retailer, thereby escaping liability. See
Carmichael 556-57.
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
57. Id. 14(a).
58. See Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 78-79, 470 P.2d 240, 244-45
(1970) (leasing agency's cross-claim against distributor and manufacturer allowed); Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 95-97, 179 N.W.2d 64, 72-73 (1970) (a retailer liable
solely because of its passive role as the seller of a product furnished to it by the manufacturer
is entitled to indemnity). See Carmichael 556-57.
59. See, e.g., Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1969); Brown
v. Quick Mix Co., 75 Wash. 2d 833, 454 P.2d 205 (1969).
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defect, even though others may have demonstrated control by later
modifying the product. 0
New Products
When new products are developed, changes can be expected as
defects which were not ascertainable during development and experi-
mentation are discovered and technological improvements are initi-
ated as a result of the knowledge generated from actual use. Evidence
of subsequent repairs and improvements may be beneficial in deter-
mining a standard of reasonable safety or merchantibility, but the
significance of such evidence should not be overemphasized."' There
may be flaws in new products, but whether these flaws are "legal
defects" is a more difficult question. Newly developed products may
be unique. The standard of merchantability implies the existence of
similar goods with which to compare the new product. 2 Similarly, the
standard of reasonable safety requires only that dangers in a product
not be "unreasonable. '6 3 Reasonableness is a relative concept, and
greater dangers may be tolerated in new products before holding the
distributor liable. The standard of reasonable safety may become
more stringent as technological improvements are made, but the stan-
dard prevailing at the time the injury-causing product was distributed
should be applied.64 The same analysis is applicable to those techno-
logical breakthroughs in design or manufacturing methods of estab-
lished products. Measured by the state of the technological art then
60. Consider, for example, Wallner v. Kitchens of Sara Lee, Inc., 419 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir.
1969), where plaintiff, injured by a machine, joined as defendants the owner of the machine
and the manufacturer-designer. The owner of the machine who had made a post-injury repair
filed a cross-claim against the manufacturer-designer and a third-party action against the
installer-maintainer of the machine asking indemnity from each if he was found liable to
plaintiff.
61. Cf. Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1965). The court said that,
although evidence of technological improvements was not barred by the rule excluding evidence
of subsequent repairs, technological improvements were "not relevant, according to principles
of 'American ingenuity of design manufacture,' to the issue of prior negligent design." Id. at
823.
62. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314(2)(c).
63. RESTATEMENT § 402A(l).
64. See Stephan v. Marlin Firearms Co., 353 F.2d 819, 823 (2d Cir. 1965) ("[the manufac-
turer] is an insurer against foreseeable risk-but not against unknowable risks"); Lartigue v.
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19,35-37 (5th Cir. 1963); Oakes v. Geigy Agric. Chems.,
272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (Dist. Ct. App. 1969); RESTATEMENT § 402A, com-
ment k; Dickerson, supra note 7, at 327-28. See generally Prosser, supra note 45, at 1143-45.
But see Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169, 170-74 (Fla. 1963).
Vol. 1972:837]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
existing, the pre-breakthrough product may be reasonably safe, even
though subsequently acquired technological skills would require a
higher degree of safety in later models. Evidence of subsequent re-
pairs and improvements may be relevant to the reasonableness of the
previous standard, but should not dictate a standard not previously
attainable and therefore not applicable.
Nevertheless, the standard of reasonable safety may depend not
only upon the stage of the product development, but also upon the
nature of the product. Products which are marketed for use or con-
sumption by individuals who must rely upon the product without a
thorough inspection for possible defects, and which by their nature
are the type of product consumers would reasonably expect to be safe,
should conform to a high standard of safety before they are put on
the market. New food products, automobiles of innovative design,
and most mass-produced consumer products should be sold only after
the manufacturer has taken every possible precaution against defects.
Individual consumers injured by such products should be permitted
to introduce evidence of subsequent repairs or improvements to sug-
gest to the jury a high standard of safety. On the other hand, products
which by their nature are inherently dangerous but which, if technol-
ogy should change, may become reasonably safe, arguably need only
conform to the pre-technological breakthrough standard so long as
consumers know of the inherent danger and accept the risk.", In such
a case, evidence of subsequent remedial action should not be used to
establish an artificially high standard of reasonable safety.
CONCLUSION
Evidence of subsequent repairs and improvements is relevant to
the products liability plaintiff's proof of product defectiveness and the
defendant's control. Exclusion of such evidence to encourage repair-
making diminishes the impact of new legal theories and may be
unnecessary in view of consumer and government groups which pro-
mote product safety. Evidence of subsequent repairs remains subject
to jury misuse, but courts have confronted similar problems with
other evidence and have developed techniques to eliminate or mini-
mize that possibility. Evidence of subsequent repairs may be intro-
duced in cases where the risk of injury is not appropriately shifted
from plaintiff to defendant; that problem requires a consciousness of
65. See note 64 supra and accompanying text.
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the ends for which the new products liability theories were developed
and the exclusion of evidence which fails to serve those ends. A policy
decision has been made by courts and legislatures to eliminate the
cost of injury for individual consumer-plaintiffs who are powerless to
protect themselves against injury from defective products. Evidence
of subsequent repairs and improvements should be admissible to im-
plement that policy decision.
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